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Abstract 
During the last years, crowdfunding gained attention as alternative source of funding for 
a variety of projects. More and more creative, artistic and entrepreneurial projects 
search funding through the crowd. However, crowdfunding markets are often considered 
inefficient and shaped by information asymmetries. Although first project characteristics 
towards governance mechanisms have been identified, the general use of governance 
mechanisms in crowdfunding and their impact on funding success have mostly remained 
uncovered. With that in mind, we present preliminary results on the influence of 
governance mechanisms on funding success of crowdfunding projects. We assessed 108 
projects from 18 platforms in order to measure the use of governance mechanisms and to 
discover differences between the types of crowdfunding. We find that archetypes of 
governance mechanisms with influence on the funding success exist and intend to 
contribute to theory that explains the use of governance mechanisms in crowdfunding. 
Keywords: Crowdfunding, Governance Mechanisms, Qualitative Comparative Analysis, QCA 
Introduction 
During recent years crowdfunding has become a viable source of funding for a variety of different projects. 
The phenomenon of crowdfunding started among creative and artistic projects and spread out towards 
start-ups and other profit-oriented businesses (Agrawal et al. 2014; Mollick 2014). Project initiators can 
kick off their funding process through a public open call on a crowdfunding platform to activate potential 
capital-givers from a crowd of Internet users. In comparison to traditional sources of funding like friends 
and family, bank loans or venture capital, crowdfunding offers considerable advantages: the speed of the  
funding process, risk diversification for capital-givers and capital-giver involvement (‘wisdom of the crowd’) 
(Kleemann et al. 2008).  There are various examples of successful crowdfunding projects. Famous examples 
are “Pebble”, a first-generation smartwatch for iPhone and Android users that raised 10 million USD from 
nearly 69,000 capital-givers, or the “Coolest Cooler”, a transportable outdoor cooling device with various 
technical gimmicks (e.g., music speaker, bottle opener, USB port) that raised more than 13 million USD 
from a crowd of roughly 63,000 capital-givers. Both projects interacted much with their capital-givers on 
different levels: they told a story around their project, they involved capital-givers through updates and 
direct communication and offered appealing compensation for participation in the project funding. These 
two examples show the enormous potential of crowdfunding. However, in practice crowdfunding projects 
either “receive all of their money or fail to receive much at all” (Wash 2013). 
A core element of crowdfunding is having IT-based platforms that act as an intermediary and constitute the 
vital link between the project initiators and the capital-givers. These platforms allow project initiators to 
interact with a large number of capital-givers in a (cost-) effective manner. Crowdfunding platforms can be 
 Governance Mechanisms in Crowdfunding 
  
 Fortieth International Conference on Information Systems, Munich 2019 2 
described as socio-technical systems that support interaction and contributions between the crowdfunding 
project and the capital-givers, who are willing to provide funding (Burtch et al. 2013a; Mollick 2014) and 
interact with the project-initiators and each other (Scheaf et al. 2018). Thereby, each crowdfunding 
platform solely defines the mode of interaction between project initiators and capital-givers (i.e., 
presentation layout, user interface, communication tools). Capital-givers from the crowd can browse and 
visit a range of projects on a crowdfunding platform. Recently, crowdfunding platforms have tended to 
specialize on certain funding purposes (i.e., funding of start-ups, creative projects, real estate projects). In 
order to present themselves, crowdfunding platforms usually offer toolkits or templates to the project 
initiators that seek funding for their project. When presenting a new project on a platform, the project 
initiators need to present their project within these boundaries. 
Current crowdfunding research defines crowdfunding markets as inefficient (Belleflamme et al. 2013; 
Zhang and Liu 2012). The strong influence of information asymmetries between the different market 
participants (Courtney et al. 2017; Scheaf et al. 2018), herding behavior of capital-givers (Kuppuswamy and 
Bayus 2018; Vulkan et al. 2016) and changing legal environments (Kappel 2008; Tomczak and Brem 2013) 
pose complex challenges for project initiators, capital-givers and crowdfunding platforms. To overcome 
these pitfalls, the literature suggests that successful projects on a crowdfunding platform make use of 
certain methods, tools or mechanisms, which allow for governing project initiators and capital-givers from 
the crowd (Belleflamme et al. 2013; Burtch et al. 2013b; Mollick 2014). We understand governance as a 
system for organizing rules and processes that regulate and coordinate the behavior of project initiators and 
capital-givers (Blohm et al. 2018; Misangyi and Acharya 2014). In the domain of crowdfunding, the 
existence of governance mechanisms has only been analyzed for single mechanisms and single cases (i.e., 
data from only one platform) in recent years (Belleflamme et al. 2015; Kraus et al. 2016; Mollick 2014). As 
a result, the understanding of governance mechanisms and their efficiency in the domain of crowdfunding 
is very limited. This raises the question which governance mechanisms exist in the field of crowdfunding 
and more importantly which effectiveness in regard to supporting the funding success of crowdfunding 
projects do they have. 
Subsequently, we aim to define governance mechanisms for crowdfunding and measure their effectiveness 
by their impact on the funding success of crowdfunding projects. We present preliminary results of a 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of governance mechanism configurations in 108 crowdfunding 
projects from 18 different crowdfunding platforms. We use the prior literature to derive six classes of 
governance mechanisms in the field of crowdfunding. Further, we define five archetypes for governance 
mechanisms that epitomize certain configurations that contribute to the funding success of crowdfunding 
projects in specific scenarios or types of crowdfunding. We discuss further research steps and our planned 
contributions to the literature streams of governance mechanisms and crowdfunding. 
Conceptual and Theoretical Foundations 
Crowdfunding: Two-Sided Market & Socio-Technical System 
Crowdfunding platforms can be described as socio-technical systems that support interaction and 
contributions between the crowdfunding project and capital-givers, who are willing to provide funding 
(Mollick 2014) and interact with the project initiators and each other. Crowdfunding platforms usually offer 
three main functions: lot size transformation (i.e., matching projects and capital-givers, providing payment 
mechanisms), risk transformation (i.e., quality assessment of presented projects, acting as a neutral and 
trustworthy partner) and information transformation (i.e., providing information about investment 
opportunities, acting as an electronic marketplace). As a result, crowdfunding can be understood as a two-
sided market where the platform offers financial intermediation functions (Belleflamme et al. 2015; Haas 
et al. 2014). In practice, this market comprises several inefficiencies. One obvious variable is the 
information asymmetry between project initiators and capital-givers (Scheaf et al. 2018). In addition, 
capital-givers in crowdfunding show similar behavior as into more traditional domains of finance such as 
herding (e.g., crowd ‘blindly’ follows first mover capital-givers) or emotionally driven decision making (e.g., 
funding decision beyond rationality) (Herzenstein et al. 2011; Zhang and Liu 2012). 
Crowdfunding is usually an IT-facilitated process where interaction and contributions between the 
crowdfunding project and capital-givers, who are willing to provide funding, are intermediated by 
crowdfunding platforms. In practice, crowdfunding platforms face major challenges posed by the different 
 Governance Mechanisms in Crowdfunding 
  
 Fortieth International Conference on Information Systems, Munich 2019 3 
types of crowdfunding, the two-sided markets and the behavior of capital-givers from the crowd. In the 
overarching domain of crowdsourcing, researchers and practitioners have raised the need for governance 
mechanisms in order to support the funding process, help to reduce the risk of negative experiences, opacity 
and fraud (Blohm et al. 2018; Mahr et al. 2015). 
Existing crowdfunding literature defines different types of crowdfunding platforms that are usually 
systematized based on the offered returns for capital-givers (i.e., financial rewards (interest, shares), non-
financial rewards (pre-ordered product, samples) or no compensation on donations). Haas et al. (2014) 
define three types of crowdfunding: Altruistic, Hedonistic and For-Profit crowdfunding. Altruistic 
crowdfunding platforms offer no material or financial rewards for capital-givers with altruistic motives. 
Hedonistic crowdfunding platforms offer a non-financial reward, e.g., product samples. For-Profit 
crowdfunding platforms offer interest payments (based on loans or equity shares) as rewards for profit-
oriented capital-givers. 
Governance Mechanisms for Crowdfunding Platforms 
Crowdfunding requires a system for organizing rules and processes that regulate and coordinate the 
behavior of project initiators and capital-givers. This system is referred to as Governance, which is reflected 
by specific mechanisms that integrate these rules and processes (Blohm et al. 2018). Existing literature 
suggests that governance involves structuring roles and responsibilities, formal and informal rules, 
standards and regulations, outcome control measures, communication processes, or matters of task 
allocation in order to achieve the project initiator’s goal on a crowdfunding platform. These rules, 
regulations and processes are operationalized by mechanisms in order to motivate a certain behavior or to 
achieve a certain goal (i.e., quality assessment of projects, providing tools for socialization). Through a 
literature research, we identified 20 distinct governance mechanisms for crowdfunding that can be 
organized into six classes. These governance mechanisms are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Governance Mechanisms in Crowdfunding 




(Ahlers et al. 2015; Mollick 
2014) 
Platform’s internal quality assessment before publishing 
projects 
Presentation templates 
(Belleflamme et al. 2015) 
Offer to initiators for presenting project on platform 
(e.g., text templates, video upload, social network 
connector)  
Funding requirements 
(Mollick 2014; Wash 2013) 
Min./Max. funding level, funding mechanisms (e.g., 
winner takes all/take all)  
Billing options 
(Belleflamme et al. 2015)   
Project initiators are billed based on funding success  
Framing 
(Herzenstein et al. 2011) 
Framing the project so that it increases in importance for 





Allowed funding amounts: Individuals vs. corporates  
Profile-based funding 
(Belleflamme et al. 2015; 
Burtch et al. 2013b)   





(Burtch et al. 2013b) 
Current state/level of funding progress in projects  
Categorization 
(Belleflamme et al. 2015) 
Organization of projects by categories 
Compensation 
(Belleflamme et al. 2013) 
Financial and non-financial rewards for capital givers  
Reputation system 
(Agrawal et al. 2014) 
Capital-givers can achieve levels/ranks based on their 
individual experience (e.g., amounts of funding)  
Feedback/follow-up 
(Xu et al. 2014) 
Providing capital-givers with feedback/follow-up info 
after funding 
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(Xu et al. 2014) 
Providing capital-givers with updates on funded projects 
and newly arrived project offers  
Socialization 
(Xu et al. 2014; Zheng et al. 
2014)   
Providing tools for direct communication between 




(Agrawal et al. 2014) 
Providing mechanisms with which experienced capital-
givers/staff provide advice to new contributors  
Tutorials 
(Belleflamme et al. 2015) 
Offering text- and / or video-based trainings as well as 
instructions on how to participate in funding  
Events 
(Belleflamme et al. 2015) 
Webinars/live events to introduce business model, 
attract capital-givers  
Regulation 
Authentication 
(Ahlers et al. 2015) 
Verifying the identity of newly registered capital-givers  
Risk/Compliance 
(Ahlers et al. 2015) 
Risk and compliance information (legal regulation) to 
inform capital-givers about rights and obligations  
Netiquette 
(Kraus et al. 2016) 
Establishing formal and informal rules of participation 
as well as terms of use with respect to desired behaviors 
of capital-givers  
Table 1. Governance Mechanisms in Crowdfunding 
Yet, it remains unclear which governance mechanisms are relevant to successfully support the funding 
process of crowdfunding projects. In addition, it is unknown which governance mechanisms can be best 
applied in which type of crowdfunding. Since there are considerable differences between the different types 
of crowdfunding (i.e., defined rewards, motivation of capital-givers, legal requirements), we assume that 
each type of crowdfunding requires certain sets of governance mechanisms. Furthermore, in practice the 
crowdfunding platforms offer different frameworks and templates to present each project. This means that 
it is the project initiator’s role to embellish the project within the given frameworks. Concretely, this 
involves different shaping of allowed formats (i.e. texts, images, videos). For example, if project initiators 
want to set cues for Framing, they need to accentuate on the specific characteristics of the project's 
contribution to greater good. It is the role of the platform to provide a system that aims towards governance 
of project initiators and capital-givers. 
Methodology 
In order to define configurations for governance mechanisms in crowdfunding projects, we analyzed data 
from 108 crowdfunding projects, 18 different crowdfunding platforms and all types of crowdfunding 
through Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). 
Data collection and Variables 
Initially, over 500 crowdfunding platforms were identified. For our analysis we considered crowdfunding 
platforms only if they were working, publicly accessible English or German website and had active business 
operations during the time of research (July 2016). In total, 254 different crowdfunding platforms fulfilled 
these criteria. We then chose six popular platforms from each type of crowdfunding in order to ensure a 
sufficient and sound sample size and an equally balanced data set with a total of 108 projects (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Investigated Crowdfunding platforms 
Platform Project Example 
Hedonistic: Kickstarter, Indiegogo, Startnext, Rockethub, 
Crowdfunder, Vision bakery 
Pebble: E-Paper Watch: Smartwatch for 
iPhone & Android 
Altruistic: Dreambank, Fundly, Betterplace, 
Socialfunders, Globalgiving, Fundrazr 
Hurricane Sandy Disaster Relief: Disaster 
relief for hurricane victims 
For-Profit: Appbackr, Crowdcube, Econeers, 
FundedByMe, AppsFunder, seedmatch 
AOTerra: Energy supply for heating by 
waste heat of servers 
Table 2. Investigated Crowdfunding platforms 
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We chose three successful and three unsuccessful projects from each platform in order to create a balanced 
sample. Additionally, we defined coherent and generally applicable selection criteria for our project choices 
from the platforms, according to the motivation of capital-givers to engage in crowdfunding (Allison et al. 
2017; Belleflamme et al. 2013). This approach led to six projects for each platform (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Project selection criteria 
Successfully funded 
1 Project from category: most successfully funded 
2 Project from category: most recent 
3 Project from random choice 
Not successfully funded 
4 Project promoted on a website or by other successful campaigns 
5 Project from category: most recent 
6 Project from random choice 
Table 3. Project selection criteria 
Project success was defined as achieving the defined funding goal within the defined time limit by the 
project initiator (i.e., 0 = project was not successfully funded; 1= project was successfully funded). The 
theory-based governance mechanisms were evaluated for each project as our unit of analysis (i.e,. 0 = 
project did not use mechanism; 1 = project used mechanism). Subsequently, this led to the exclusion of 11 
governance mechanisms of which 2 had not been used at all (Profile-based funding, Events) and 9 
mechanisms had been used in every analyzed project (Quality assessment, Presentation templates, Funding 
requirements, Billing options, Funding overview, Tutorials, Authentication, Risk/Compliance, Netiquette). 
We identify the 9 governance mechanisms as a mandatory baseline to set up a crowdfunding project (see 
Preliminary Results). The remaining 9 governance mechanisms have been considered as conditions for the 
next coherent steps of our analysis (Greckhamer et al. 2013). 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
In social sciences set relations (i.e., sets/configurations of variables) are central for theory-building (Ragin 
2008a). As a result, QCA has recently gained significant attention among researchers and practitioners 
(Fiss 2011; Huarng and Roig-Tierno 2016; Kraus et al. 2016; Marx and Dusa 2016). QCA is a set-theoretic 
approach that aims to define combinations of casual conditions (i.e., configuration of governance 
mechanisms) that contribute to a certain outcome (i.e., successful crowdfunding projects) (Marx and Dusa 
2016). 
We conducted the analysis of our data using the QCA method with two iterations. The first iteration includes 
an overall analysis of our collected data. The preliminary results of this step are presented below. Next, we 
conduct a second iteration in order to analyze the data based on the different types of crowdfunding. In 
Crisp-Set QCA (csQCA), binary-coded data are used to indicate either membership (‘1’) or non-membership 
(‘0’) of a set of variables. If applied correctly, csQCA discovers one or more casual paths to the explained 
outcome as configurations in an explanatory model (Rihoux 2003). Most researchers have focused on 
categorizing relevant variables into configurations to achieve certain outcomes, such as satisfaction, profit, 
performance (Kraus et al. 2016; Marx and Dusa 2016). Accordingly, we followed the csQCA section of 
Ragin’s (2008b) QCA guide step by step.  
After defining the conditions (i.e., governance mechanisms), we calculate the truth table that shows all 
possible configurations of the defined conditions and can be described as a data matrix. In our analysis, we 
defined 9 conditions, relating to the most relevant governance mechanisms (Framing, Attribute-based 
Funding, Categorization, Compensation, Reputation System, Feedback/Follow-up, Updates, Socialization, 
Peer Coaching), which resulted in 512 possible configurations. In order to refine the truth table, we excluded 
less relevant configurations by assessing the configurations based on the calculated frequency and 
consistency values. Following Ragin (2008b), we defined a frequency threshold of 3 to include only 
configurations of governance mechanisms that occurred at least 3 times in our overall data in the first 
iteration. Consistency values can be compared to correlations and show the degree of overlap between the 
combinations of conditions in relation to a certain outcome in specific cases. Ragin (2008b) proposes that 
the acceptable consistency should be equal or above 0.75. In line with this recommendation and further 
literature (Marx and Dusa 2016; Misangyi and Acharya 2014), we specified the consistency cutoff as 0.75. 
As a last step, the truth table needs to be analyzed. For this analysis Ragin (2008b) suggests to apply the 
Quine-McCluskey algorithm. The algorithm calculates combinations of conditions which lead to the specific 
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outcome (i.e., funding success) by removing inconsistent or absent conditions in relation to the outcome. 
The analysis provides a set of solutions that is based on a different treatment of remainder combinations 
(Ragin 2008b) and shows the combinations of governance mechanisms as configurations that lead to or 
support the likelihood of successful funding. 
Preliminary Results 
The results of the first iteration with the overall analysis of our data are presented in Table 4. By applying 
csQCA we were able to identify five different configurations of governance mechanisms in crowdfunding 
projects. The configurations were identified through the calculated consistency and coverage values that 
are measured for each configuration individually and for all identified configurations. Coverage values show 
to which percentage a configuration of governance mechanisms can explain funding success. csQCA 
provides two coverage values: raw coverage and unique coverage. While raw coverage measures the 
observed proportion of cases with a certain combination in a data set, unique coverage accounts for the 
proportion of cases with a membership in one specific configuration that is not covered by any other 
configuration (Ragin 2008b, 2008a). Consistency describes the likelihood of a configuration or a set of 
configurations to explain a certain outcome. Raw coverage ranges from .056 to .333. Consistency ranges 
from .667 to 1.000. Our calculated Overall Solution Consistency indicates that our five configurations can 
result in a high likelihood of successful funding with 61.1%. The Overall Solution Coverage indicates 89.1% 
of all our cases as the extent to which these five configurations cover a high likelihood of successful funding. 
The overall solution consistency and the overall solution coverage are in conformity with Ragin’s (2008b) 
and Greckhammer’s (2013) recommendations regarding the application of large-N QCA. Both values 
support and surpass the argument of sufficiency (Rihoux et al. 2012). 
We were able to identify five distinct configurations that are presented in Table 4. Each configuration 
consists of present and absent conditions. 
Table 4. Preliminary Governance Mechanism Configurations 
Conditions 
Configurations 
1 2 3 4 5 
Project Offering  
Framing      
Funding Allocation 
Attribute-based funding      
Funding Incentives  
Categorization      
Compensation      
Reputation system      
Capital-giver Interaction  
Feedback/Follow-up      
Updates      
Socialization      
Qualification 
Peer Coaching      
Consistency 0.857 0.667 1.000 1.000 0.947 
Raw Coverage 0.111 0.111 0.056 0.056 0.333 
Unique Coverage 0.056 0.111 0.056 0.056 0.278 
Overall Solution Consistency 0.611 
Overall Solution Coverage 0.891 
Table 4. Preliminary Governance Mechanism Configurations 
The presence of a condition is indicated by a black circle. A condition that is absent is indicated by a crossed-
out circle. For each configuration, large circles indicate a core condition, while small circles indicate 
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peripheral conditions. Blank cells indicate that a condition has no influence on the outcome and can be 
either present or absent. 
These five configurations consist of distinct sets of conditions that can be transformed to five different 
configuration archetypes. In four of five archetypes, socialization and framing play important roles which 
is in accordance with existing research in this field (Butticè et al. 2017; Colombo et al. 2015; Giudici et al. 
2013; Herzenstein, Sonenshein et al. 2011). When aiming to set up archetype configurations according to 
our definition, it is important to also include the basic governance mechanisms that have been excluded in 
the QCA and that need to be used in order to set up a crowdfunding project on any of the observed platforms. 
The story-oriented archetype (1) emphasizes framing and socialization as core elements. While 
categorization plays a peripheral role, governance mechanisms regarding compensation are absent. This 
indicates a setting in Altruistic crowdfunding scenarios, where capital-givers’ funding decisions are strongly 
driven by their emotions. The prestige-oriented archetype (2) focusses on compensation and a reputation 
system besides updates and framing. Especially the first three mechanisms have a strong external impact 
and can be seen by other stakeholders on the platform. This archetype is applicable in Hedonistic and For-
Profit crowdfunding scenarios, where compensation (e.g., product sample, share/interest payments) and 
reputation (e.g., showing funding experience to other capital-givers) play important roles. The socially-
oriented archetype (3) accentuates the interaction between the project initiators and capital-givers with 
updates and socialization as a core mechanism. Additionally, categorization and attribute-based funding 
play a minor role in these configurations. Again, compensation is absent in this archetype. This can be an 
indicator for Altruistic crowdfunding. Applying this configuration on a project might attract capital-givers 
with the willingness to participate in the project without compensation.  The innovation-oriented archetype 
(4) is similar to the social-oriented archetype with the addition of mechanisms for peer coaching and 
framing. This configuration indicates characteristics of projects and capital-givers among Hedonistic 
crowdfunding scenarios, where capital-givers often act in communities with interaction among each other 
and with project initiators. The interaction-oriented archetype (5) is characterized by all three interaction 
mechanisms and framing. In addition, categorization plays a subordinate role. This archetype could be 
applied in any of the three types of crowdfunding and strongly aims towards the interaction between project 
initiators and platform. 
Research Outlook and Intended Contributions 
In this short paper, we identified configurational sets of governance mechanisms that enable project 
initiators to increase the likelihood of conducting a successful crowdfunding project. Our preliminary 
research identifies distinct governance mechanism configurations that we interpret as governance 
archetypes for capital-givers in order to manage their crowdfunding projects. 
In order to elaborate on this impact, we plan to specify our QCA analysis by applying the method to data 
from each type of crowdfunding. Existing literature suggests that differences in the configurations between 
the types of crowdfunding exist (Belleflamme et al. 2013; Schulz et al. 2015). For instance, For-Profit 
crowdfunding projects might need a different set of governance mechanisms than Altruistic projects. In 
addition, the relationship and interaction between governance mechanisms and already identified variables 
with an impact on the funding success (e.g., storytelling) will be further analyzed. Subsequently, more 
accurate suggestions for specific sets of effective governance mechanisms for each type of crowdfunding 
will be derived. These governance mechanisms are supposed to aim directly towards the needs of the 
different capital-givers from the crowd. In terms of measuring the performance of governance mechanisms, 
we will build on and extend existing concepts (Blohm et al. 2018; Misangyi and Acharya 2014). However, 
the specific characteristics of crowdfunding with its three stakeholders will provide new insights in both 
fields of research.  
With this research, we intend to make two important contributions for current crowdfunding research 
(Belleflamme et al. 2015; Kraus et al. 2016; Scheaf et al. 2018): 
First, our research defines governance mechanisms in the field of crowdfunding. Additionally, we 
investigate configurations of these governance mechanisms that have an impact on the funding success of 
crowdfunding projects. Secondly, we aim to identify more specific archetypes of governance mechanisms 
for each type of crowdfunding. A first step towards this goal has already been presented in this paper.  
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The primary intention of project initiators for offering appropriate governance mechanisms is to increase 
the likelihood of a successful funding process. Similarly, platforms can leverage the results by implementing 
the applicable governance mechanisms and by offering certain templates and toolkits to project initiators 
in order to realize and deploy the mechanisms in their project offering. In addition, platforms need to 
inform and incentivize project initiators to use the provided templates and toolkits accordingly when 
presenting their project towards the crowd. We expect the configurations of governance mechanisms to 
have an impact on the funding performance of the different crowdfunding projects. 
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